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ince becoming British Foreign Secretary more than two years ago, William Hague has 
engaged in what the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) calls a “network shift”, 
which partly aims to put the ‘C’ back into the FCO. Hague recently met his Canadian 
counterpart John Baird in Ottawa on September 24th to review and refresh the Canada-UK 
Joint Declaration agreed by Prime Ministers David Cameron and Stephen Harper a year ago. 
The  foreign  ministers  signed  a  Memorandum  of  Understanding  (MoU)  on  “Enhancing 
Mutual Support at Missions Abroad”. The MoU will allow the UK and Canada to optimise 
their  respective  diplomatic  resources  by  sharing  embassy  and  consulate  sites,  the  joint 
acquisition, supply and use of services, as well as collaboration on crisis response, consular 
services, security, diplomatic mail, information management and IT. Describing the UK and 
Canada as “first cousins” under one queen and united by a set of values and “common 
interests”, William Hague said in a press statement that it was “natural that we look to link 
up our embassies with Canada’s in places where that suits both countries” so as to widen the 
reach abroad for businesses and citizens for less cost.  
This UK move to cooperate with Canada on sharing embassy facilities abroad fuels doubt 
about the UK’s commitment to develop its political and diplomatic ties to the EU. It has 
reinforced perceptions held at EU headquarters and in capitals of some member states that 
the Tory-led coalition government of David Cameron remains ambivalent about forging a 
‘Common’ European Foreign and Security Policy backed up by a strong EEAS. 
In fact, it is striking to note that the EU, the EEAS, and the UK’s commitments within the EU 
framework  are  not  mentioned  once  in  the  MoU.  At  the  same  time,  this  development  is 
indicative of an increasing form of ‘EU denial’ on the part of the UK. In the area of EU 
foreign policy, the UK has consistently warned against ‘competence creep’. London has i) 
opposed the High Representative’s 2011 proposal for a 5.8% increase in the EEAS’ budget; ii) 
blocked the adoption of more than 70 statements to be issued “on behalf of the EU”, causing 
them to expire; and iii) criticised the High Representative and the EU diplomatic service for 
lacking ideas, reacting too slowly to world events and for failing to implement agreed policy. 
Somewhat cynically, especially in view of the new MoU with Canada, the UK was among 
the  member  states  countering  pleas  by  smaller  members  like  Austria  and  the  Benelux 
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countries to expand the ‘supporting role’ of EU delegations in consular protection and crisis 
management. 
The UK-Canada MoU therefore raises a number of questions about the UK’s commitment as 
an EU member state and its position regarding various pieces of the future ‘political union’ 
puzzle. 
The first question relates to the principle of sincere and loyal cooperation; one of the Union’s 
founding principles. According to one aspect of this general principle of EU law, a member 
state must “refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s 
objectives” (Article 4(3) TEU). Pursuant to another strand of the same principle, a member 
state is also under obligation to support the EU’s external and security policy “actively and 
unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union’s 
action in this area” (Article 24(3) TEU).  
One could read the UK’s plan to share diplomatic facilities and consular services abroad with 
a non-EU member state as purely  an attempt to ‘save costs’ and not as cooperation on ‘ways 
of doing things’ in policy areas. Yet, one cannot but wonder how far it is possible to ensure 
that cooperation on services will not impact, and potentially conflict with, specific policies 
with an EU dimension. Arguably, this MoU runs counter to the spirit of loyal cooperation, in 
particular at the level of the coordination of key policy positions and information exchange 
between  the  EEAS,  EU  delegations  and  EU  member  states’  embassies  in  third  countries.  
Clearly, there is potential to undermine the interests and effectiveness of the Union in the 
spheres of external and security policies. To what extent can the EU or its member states 
trust the UK in the sharing of classified information of strategic importance, in particular in 
international relations with Canada?  
Similar dilemmas might be anticipated in relation to key dossiers under discussion in the 
wider EU-Canada partnership, some of which are particularly sensitive for certain member 
states. For instance, the MoU is unlikely to bring clarity to the Canada-Czech Republic visa 
dispute.1  Since 2009 Canada has officially justified its application of temporary resident visa 
(TRV) requirements for nationals of the Czech Republic as a measure to limit the increase in 
asylum applications from Czech nationals of ‘Roma origin’. This was the first time that a 
third  country  whose  nationals  enjoy  visa-free  travel  to  the  EU  reintroduced  a  visa 
requirement for the nationals of an EU member state. The TRV obligation thus breaches the 
principle of reciprocity that lies at the core of the EU’s common visa policy. The European 
Parliament  and  a  number  of  member  states  have  linked  the  success  of  the  proposed 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada to the resolution of 
this visa dispute.  
True, the UK does not participate in the common EU visa policy. It can ‘opt out’ of or ‘opt in’ 
to participation in migration, borders and asylum legislative measures. The UK has not been 
allowed to opt in to border controls and visa measures building upon the Schengen acquis. 
The  UK  does  however  take  part  in  EU  police  cooperation  and  judicial  cooperation  in 
criminal matters, which may be subject to revision before the end of 2014, and the policing 
and  criminal  law  parts  (including  information  exchange)  of  the  Schengen  Information 
System (SIS). That notwithstanding, the UK-Canada MoU may bring further confusion to the 
EU’s strategic position on this ‘visa affair’ as it is closely linked with the trade discussions 
under the CETA, to which the UK is full party. 
                                                   
1 See Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild and Massimo Merlino, “The Canada-Czech Republic Visa Dispute 
two years on”, CEPS Paper in Liberty & Security in Europe, CEPS, Brussels, October 2011 
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The protection of EU citizens abroad constitutes another example of a policy challenge when 
considering the incoherencies that may emerge from the UK-Canada MoU. The protection 
granted  by  diplomatic  missions  abroad  is  one  of  the  core  components  and  rights  of  EU 
citizenship and has been said by the European Commission and the European Parliament to 
constitute “a direct expression of the principle of EU solidarity and of the ‘identity’ of the EU 
in third countries”. It represents a practical benefit of the status of European citizenship, in 
which the UK is a full participant. The MoU may lead to misunderstandings regarding the 
UK’s commitments on the protection of EU citizens abroad, and in particular how the UK 
will ensure a ‘common EU identity’ in the area of EU citizenship abroad when providing 
common consular services alongside a country applying visa restrictions to Czech nationals.  
In sum, the UK’s move to cooperate with Canada to pool and share embassy facilities in 
third countries may not only undermine efforts to forge a coherent, consistent and effective 
EU foreign policy, it may also throw a spanner in the works of EU solidarity and the creation 
of a stronger EU identity, both internally and externally. The European Commission has 
already fired a shot across the bow of Britain’s coalition government, expressing increasing 
concern about attacks on core EU principles and threatening to take the UK to the European 
Court of Justice if it fails to respect key elements of EU law. Rather than further agreements 
that undermine the workings of the EU, the British government might be better advised to 
heed the language of the Treaty on European Union, to which it is a signatory, to “ensure 
fulfilment  of  the  obligations  arising  out  of  the  Treaties  or  resulting  from  the  acts  of  the 
institutions of the Union”. 